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Robert E. Looney 
Department of National Security Affairs, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, 
California 93943 USA 
Abstract 
The purpose of this paper is to assess the manner in which the Government's 
fiscal polices affect the willingness of the private sector to invest, especially in 
the all-important manufacturing sector. Using an optimal control analysis to 
examine alternative fiscal packages, it is shown that proper economic 
management can return the country to a high growth path while avoiding many 
of the imbalances that have characterized recent economic performance. This 
analysis suggests that deficit reduction must be the key element in any future 
policy package. 
1. Introduction 
The recent economic difficulties facing Pakistan -widening fiscal and 
current account deficits, growing foreign debt burden, and slowing growth 
rates- have led to a fundamental assessment of the country's adjustment and 
development strategy. Specifically the sentiment in economic and policy 
making circles has shifted against large-scale government intervention and 
toward greater reliance on the market in the allocation and use of resources 
(Kahn and Reinhart, 1990: 19). 
Conventional wisdom is that the way to prosperity, as represented by a 
sustained higher rate of economic growth requires stable and conservative 
macroeconomic policies, liberalization of the goods and factor markets, 
greater flexibility in the financial system, and an enhanced role for the private 
system in economic activity. 
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Even if it can be assumed that an increase in private investment, other 
things being equal, has an unambiguous positive effect on output, it is still 
necessary to establish how private investment in Pakistan is determined -in 
particular, what variables systematically affect it- before one can evaluate the 
influence that government can exercise over private investment decision. The 
purpose of this paper is to undertake this examination, particularly as it 
pertains to private sector investment in manufacturing. 
Ultimately our objective is to integrate the private investment decision 
into a macroeconomic forecasting model. In turn this model will be used to 
assess the manner in which the Pakistani economy might evolve under 
alternative policy packages. The philosophy underlying this approach stresses 
the importance of examining private sector investment in the context of the 
government's overall development and budgetary strategies. 
2. Macro-imbalances 
Although Pakistan's growth performance during the 1980s was healthy 
(averaging more then 6% per annum), and inflation, while fluctuating 
considerably was generally moderate (averaging 7% per annum), the 
increasing macroeconomic imbalances, growth of public sector deficits and 
indebtedness, and underlying structural weaknesses convinced the 
Government that without corrective action the economy's growth performance 
could not be sustained. Accordingly, in early Fiscal Year 1989 (FY89) the 
government embarked on a macroeconomic structural adjustment program 
which has been implemented more or less continuously up to the present 
time. 
The Government realized that the economy's main weaknesses were: (i) 
low savings and investment rates, particularly in the public sector, (ii) 
structural rigidities and distortions in the incentive system, which reduced 
efficiency and depressed economic activity, and (iii) limited progress in 
education, health and nutrition. Among the most important issues to be 
addressed through the reform effort were the following: 
a. Fiscal Policy. Pressure the fiscal accounts increased during the 1980s 
and the budget deficit reached an uhsustainable 8.5% of GDP in Fiscal Year 
1988 (FY88). One factor behind this deterioration was stagnant public 
revenues heavily dependent on trade taxes and inelastic domestic taxes. 
Despite the growing deficits, e;;xpenditures to build, and maintain and operate 
key development program/projects in the social sectors and infrastructure 
were inadequate. Non-development expenditures, in particular interest 
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payments, defense, and subsidies (mainly food and agricultural input price 
subsidies) absorbed an increasing proportion of current outlays (about two-
thirds by FY88). 
b. The External Accounts. Despite healthy export performance, the 
external accounts were also under increasing pressure during this period and 
the current account deficit reached 4.3% of GNP in FY88, mainly due to 
declining remittances and a growing interest burden. Creditworthiness 
indicators deteriorated as excessive borrowing led to an increase in the debt 
service ratio from 20% of exports of goods and services in FY81 to 25%-
30% during the mid-1980s. 
c. Social Indicators. While the population was growing quickly at about 
3.1% per annum, human resource development -mainly the responsibility of 
the provinces- was underfunded and implementation constraints reduced the 
effectiveness of government actions. Thus, social indicators continued to lag 
significantly behind those of comparable countries and the demands of the 
population for basic social services could not be met adequately. 
d. Private Sector Activity. The private sector was confronted with 
pervasive regulatory controls in manufacturing and burdened by large public 
enterprises suffering from poor performance and inefficiency. It was also 
unable to fully exploit its growth potential due to an insufficient infrastructure 
and a poorly educated and trained workforce. The incentive system was 
distorted by high tariff and non-tariff barriers, a domestic tax system that 
taxes production rather than consumption and administered interest rates and 
prices. As a result, innovation was discouraged and the industrial sector 
remained narrow. 
Perhaps the most ominous pattern concerns savings and investment. Both 
of these rates are low by international standards (averaging 14.1 % and 18.9% 
of GNP, respectively) during the five years ended in June 1993. Usually 
countries capable of sustaining growth in the 5-7% range save and invest 
more than 20% of their GNP'. 
While various reasons have been put forward to explain the country's 
lackluster savings performance (Aftab Khan, 1993a, 1993b), it is clear that 
the main imbalance between savings and investment in Pakistan arises in the 
public sector. The budget deficit, i.e. \he gap between consolidated public 
revenues and expenditures is currently the most serious macro problem facing 
For example, during the period 1980-91 China, Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia, 
Mauritius, Oman, Singapore and Thailand (World Bank,1993) all achieved average annual 
rates of growth of over 5.0 % per annum and savings rates over 20 % (usually over 30 %). 
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the economy. There was a persistent growth in the dimensions of the overall 
deficit in the 1970s and 1980s culminating in FY 87-88 when it reached Rs. 
57.6 billion or 8.5% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). This gap emerged 
because of inadequately restrained expenditure policies, weak revenues and 
poor performance of the state-owned enterprises. In particular, the tax 
system was marked by a narrow base, low elasticity with respect to overall 
economic growth. 
In the summer of 1988 with the assistance from the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), Pakistan embarked on an adjustment program 
designed to address macro-economic imbalances and ensure steady growth 
of the economy at a respectable rate within an environment of low inflation. 
In the fiscal field this macro-economic adjustment program envisaged a 
gradual reduction of the overall fiscal deficit to 4.8% of GDP through 
resource mobilization efforts aimed at increasing the tax revenue elasticity. 
In order to understand the fiscal choices (constraints) for the coming 
years, the government will have to acknowledge the budgetary constraint set 
by the "sustainable deficit". This can be defined simply as the deficit level 
that can be financed without insupportable internal and external debt service 
ratios and without violating the government's macro-economic objectives 
such as low inflation, viable balance of payments and real economic growth. 
On the basis of studies conducted by the Planning Commission as well 
as the International Monetary Fund it appears that a fiscal deficit in excess 
of 5% of GDP could have adverse macro-economic consequences including 
the danger of accelerated inflation. In any case government's ability to create 
additional debt for financing budgetary deficits over this level will be sharply 
constrained by the existing high level of indebtedness. Even worse, deficits 
more than 5% might cause the demand for government debt to sharply 
decline due to investor concerns over ability of the government to service its 
debt. In such a situation the government would also be forced to sharply 
increase its interest rates, risking driving out a considerable amount of private 
investment. 
3. Factors affecting private investment 
• 
As noted above growing fiscal imbalances have increased concern about 
the possible crowding out of private investors from the country's financial 
markets. Potentially this is an extremely serious problem. However, there are 
a number of additional factors that may affect the investment decision. Unless 
these are systematically controlled for one might incorrectly conclude those 
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growing government deficits were solely responsible for the private sector's 
observed pattern of investment. Unfortunately, many of the published studies 
on private investment in Pakistan are not linked to a broader macroeconomic 
context capable of systematically examining these linkages. 
In recent years several studies (Chishti et al. 1992; Haque et al. 1994) 
have tried to bridge this important gap. Here it should be noted that the 
impact stimulus on private investment of government expenditures per se 
may not be that strong simply because about 75% of the total current 
expenditures of the federal government is in general accounted for by defense 
and debt servicing which have most likely no significant and positive impact 
on GDP (Chishti et al. 1992: 369). 
Here it is important to note that budgetary deficits in themselves do not 
automatically imply macroeconomic problems. If the use of public resources 
is sufficiently productive, further income can be generated to cover the 
servicing costs of any debt incurred. Deficits can be more easily absorbed 
by countries with high rates of domestic savings and well-developed capital 
markets. Thus a relatively high deficit need not cause problems in an efficient 
high-saving economy, whereas in a low-saving economy like Pakistan (6% 
of GDP) with inefficient and less developed financial markets, even a small 
deficit might be destabilizing. 
Starting from this position Khan and Iqbal (1991) examined the whole 
issue of crowding-out, i.e., whether the ever rising government expenditures 
displace an equal amount of spending from the private sector. As they note, 
macroeconomic effects of fiscal deficits can be examined in the light of three 
(FitzGerald, 1979; FitzGerald, 1980; Looney and Frederiksen, 1987) different 
theories, viz. conventional crowding-out, Keynesian crowding-out, and the 
monetary approach to the balance of payments (Khan and Iqbal, 1991): 
• Conventional crowding-out takes place when the fiscal deficit is 
financed by selling government bonds which ultimately increase interest rates 
which then cause private investment to decline. 
• The Keynesian crowding-out takes place when deficits are financed by 
reducing private consumption, that is, by increasing private savings. 
•Under the monetary approach, the deficit is financed by money creation 
which leads to an excess supply of casfi balances. Individuals reduce their 
surplus holdings by increased expenditures; under this approach adjustment 
is made entirely through increased imports. The full effect of the deficit is 
felt by the worsening external balance. 
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In their study Khan and Iqbal (1991) found no evidence of conventional 
as well as Keynesian crowding-out. On the other hand they show that 
deterioration of the fiscal deficit has been worsening the current account 
balance, a finding which is in line with the monetary approach to the balance 
of payments. 
In addition, they find that increases in the fiscal deficit have reduced 
private savings and hence investment and growth in Pakistan. Besides the 
existence of financial repression (low or negative real interest rates) and the 
lack of financial development (few financial institutions and the availability 
of few financial instruments), the fiscal deficit appears to be an important 
factor in accounting for such low savings. In short, their findings suggest 
that government savings is a substitute for private savings. 
In a related paper on factors affecting private investment Khan (1988) 
finds that (289-90): 
• On the one hand, changes in output appear to have minor impact on 
private investment while on the other hand, the general market condition 
appears to have a strong influence on private capital formation. 
• Private investment in Pakistan was constrained by the availability of 
funds. Thus, the monetary authority can influence private investment behavior 
by changing bank credit to this sector. Fiscal policy appears to have a 
relatively stronger effect on private investment. 
• Public sector investment in providing infrastructure clearly augments 
private capital formation in Pakistan, thereby confirming its complementary 
role. 
In contrast to Khan and Iqbal (1991), Burney and Yasmeen (1989) 
focused on the budgetary effects on interest rates. Their findings suggest that, 
in general, the overall government budget deficit in Pakistan does not have 
any significant impact on the nominal interest rates. However, when assumed 
that people can predict the foture rate of inflation accurately the overall 
deficit is found to have a significant impact on the nominal interest rate. 
Although they do not directly examine the impact on private investment, it 
is noted that there may be an inverse relationship between investment and 
nominal interest rates. If this is in fact the case, their results suggest that an 
increase in the overall deficit is likely to crowd-out private investment 
expenditure in Pakistan. 
In short, the studies noted above suggest that a Keynesian expenditure 
based model may provide a more accurate depiction of Pakistan's macro-
economy than that derived from a monetarist approach. Within this 
framework, however, the works of Khan-Iqbal and Burney-Yasmeen caution 
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that public investment may not, because of crowding-out effects, be 
particularly effective in spurring expanded private sector investment. 
To gain a rough idea of the causal links between government 
expenditures (general government, defense and consumption), and private 
investment in manufacturing (both large scale and small scale), a series of 
Granger (1969, 1988) causality tests were performed. Because the literature 
suggests the manner in funding government expenditures may have a number 
of secondary effects on private investment, the link between each expenditure 
category, the deficit, aT]d subsequent borrowing were also examined in detail. 
The main findings (Looney, 1992: 90-8) of these causality tests are 
suggestive of the existence of crowding-out. Interestingly, public investment 
and infrastructural development appear to have the least stimulating (and in 
some cases, negative) effect on private sector investment. This is somewhat 
ironic, given that a major purpose of these allocations is to provide a stimulus 
to follow on private investment. Clearly this effect stems from the large 
demands placed on the domestic capital market by this type of expenditure. 
At the other extreme is defense. Again a somewhat ironic pattern exists 
whereby expanded military expenditures provide a generally strong stimulus 
to private investment in large scale private manufacturing. While the analysis 
does not let us identify the cause of this stimulus (general Keynesian 
demand expansion and/or direct linkages to the country's military 
procurement program), the fact remains that the government has shown 
restraint in funding defense expenditures once domestic borrowing begins to 
accelerate. 
General public consumption falls somewhere in between defense and 
investment in affecting the private sector's willingness (or ability) to commit 
capital to manufacturing. While the government does fund increased 
consumption through expanded domestic borrowing, the magnitudes involved 
do not appear to be nearly as great as in the case of investment. Thus 
government consumption is still able to provide a net positive stimulus to 
small scale private investors (who presumably are not as reliant on the 
domestic capital markets as is the case for their larger scale counterparts). 
4. Private investment and macro-economic policy 
Drawing on the literature and the causality tests summarized above, a 
twenty-four equation policy model was developed (Table 1). Here, our main 
concern was capturing the main potential links between government 
expenditures, deficits and private investment. For some of these variables 
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such as growth the links are direct. For others such as private investment the 
links are more indirect, working through the impact of defense on the deficit, 
the impact of the deficit on savings and ultimately the impact of savings on 
private investment. 
With regard to the more important individual equations2 (Table 1 ): 
•Aggregate demand (Eq. 1) is affected mainly by employment (a proxy 
for consumer expenditures), lagged military expenditures (the largest public 
sector expenditure item) and private investment. Public investment was 
insignificant when included in the equation). Government investment was not 
statistically significant in affecting GDP. 
• Potential supply (Eq. 2) was assumed to be a function of factor inputs 
-labor and capital. Again, a distinction was made between stocks of capital 
in public and private sectors. 
•As noted earlier (Looney, 1992) the factors affecting private investment 
in large and small scale units vary considerably. Private investment in large 
scale industry is aided on the demand side by military expenditures. It also 
benefits from foreign borrowing and increased national savings. As noted 
in the causality findings, small scale investment is favorably influenced by 
public allocations to non-defense activities. 
• Private investment in non-manufacturing activities is also strongly 
affected by the savings rate'. 
5. Endogenous simulation 
To provide a benchmark, the first set of simulations undertaken was 
essentially an extrapolation of key macro economic and investment variables 
to the year 2000. Here, using the estimated equations summarized in Table 
1, two exogenous variables, i.e. employment, growing at 3% per annum and 
the import price index, increasing at 5% per annum generated values for the 
key aggregates up to the end of the century. Several patterns (Tables 2-3) 
stand out: 
2 This model is an expanded version of one developed in Looney (1992). That model was 
used exclusively to simulate the period 1974-1991 under different assumptions concerning 
government investment and foreign public borrowing. There was no optimal control element 
incorporated into that analysis, nor were any forecasts made. 
3 
4 
This is consistent with the findings presented in Khan and Reinhart (1990), who found that 
private investment has a larger direct effect on growth than public investment. 
Again, consistent with the findings of Khan and Iqbal (1991). 
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Table 1 
Pakistan: Private Investment and the Macroeconomy, Simulation Model 
(constant 1985 prices) 
STRUCTURAL EQUATIONS 
(1) Gross Domestic Produce (GDP) 
GDP= - 129.72 + 12.05 EMP + 5.97 MIL-"<•-ll + 3.16 IPTP 
(-3.83) (5.99)*** (8.20)*** (4.98)*** 
r2(adj) = 0.997; DW = 2.19; F = 2715.6 
(2) Potential Supply (GDPS) 
GDPS = - 88.27 + 8.21 EMP + 2.05 PK + 2.67 GK 
(-1.71) (1.96)* (6.11)*** (2.27)** 
r2(adj) = 0.993; DW = 2.86; F = 831.98 
(3) Total Government Investment (JGT) 
IGT = 6.82 + 0.47*1GT(t-1) + l.04*1NFR 
(3.72) (2.53)** (4.14)*** 
r2(adj) = 0.992; DW = 2.11; F = 853.5 
(4) Defense Expenditures (MJLX) 
MILX = -4.90 + 0.12 GDP<•-IJ - 0.21 IGT<•-lll - 0.14 GDEF<•·ll - 0.20 GDEF<•·2> (-4.21) (14.94)*** (-3.00)*** (-2.21)** (-3.33)*** 
r2(adj) = 0.987; DW = 1.91; F = 329.97 
(5) Public Infrastructure Investment (JNFR) 
INFR = 2.86 + 0.74 INFR,1_1> + 0.21 IPMT (2.53) (5.56)* * * (1.92)* 
r2(adj) = 0.951; Durbin's H = 0.35; F = 166.21 
(6) Non-Defense Expenditures (NILX) 
NILX = -16.27 + 0.56 NIL-"<i-iJ + 2.90 INFR 
(-2.06) (3.08)** (2.71)** 
r2(adj) = 0.953; Durbin's H = -0.51; F = 192.72 
(7) Government Revenues (GR) 
GR = -20.77 + 0.21 GDP<1-1> + 0.27 ~GDP<t-1> 
(-9.27) (25.44)*** (2.27)** 
r2(adj) = 0.991; DW = 1.85; F = 906.68 
(8) Government Domestic Borrowing (BORD) 
BORD= 12.99 + 0.73 GDEF<t-1> - 0.91 BORF<•·t> 
(4.01) (5.10)*** (-2.91)** 
r2(adj) = 0.610; DW = 2.37; F = 1~.31 




xJJ.M..;, ao · 
MSGCP = 46.94 + 1.93 GDEF<•·ll + 1.91 GDEF<•·2> - 2.07 BORF + 7.38 MILX (2.77) (2.72)** (2.59)** (-2.01)** (1.78)* 
r2(adj) = 0.805; DW = 1.90; F = 18.51 
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STRUCTURAL EQUATIONS 
Table 1 (contd.) 
(constant 1985 prices) 
(10) Gross Domestic Product Deflator (GDPDF) 
GDPDF = 0.12 + 0.67 GDPDF<•·ll + 0.002 MSGC + 0.07 UVZ 
(5.52) (8.99)*** (5.47)*** (2.06)** 
r2(adj) = 0.998; Durbin's H = -1.52; F = 2988.55 
(11) Government Net Foreign Borrowing (BORF) 
BORF = 7.57 + 0.32 BORF<1-1> + 0.48 GDEF- 0.17 GNS<•-ll 
(3.22) (2.07)** (4.59)*** (-3.74)*** 
r2(adj) = 0.740; Durbin.s H = -1.49; F = 17.15 
(12) Gross National Savings (GNS) 
GNS = -32.7 + 0.29 GDP<i-i> - 1.02 GDEF - 0.62 GDEF,1•1> (-5.06) (10.23)*** (-2.68)** (-1.97)* 
r2(adj) = 0.949; DW = 2.22; F = 86.97 
(13) Private Investment in Small Scale Manufacturing (/PMS) 
IPMS = 0.01 + 0.87 IPMS<i-i) - 0.008 BORD<r-i> + 0.007 NILX 
(0.27) (8.34)*** (-3.25)*** (3.85)*** 
r2(adj) = 0.995; Durbin's H = -0.51; F = 885.1 
(14) Private Investment in Large-Scale Manufacturing (JPML) 
l•~i:U-
1 !I; '{"Vt 
IPML = -4.54 + 0.77 IPML<•-i> - 0.08 BORD<1-1> + 0.19 MIL~1• 1 > + 0.15 BORF<1-1> (-3.71) (6.31)*** (-2.80)** (2.81)** (3.14)*** 
+ 0.02 GNS 
(1.82)* 
r2(adj) = 0.991; Durbin's H = -1.24; F = 368.5 
(15) Private Investment in Non-Manufacturing (!PNM) 
IPNM = 2.47 + 0.07 GDP<1-1> - 0.34 MILX + 0.08 GNS 
(3.12) (7.13)*** (-3.04)*** (3.20)*** 
r2(adj) = 0.987; DW = 1.75; F = 414.98 
IDENTITIES 
(16) Government Expenditures (GE) 
GE = MILX + NILX 
(17) Government Deficit (GDEF) 
GDEF= GE- GR 
(18) Change in Gross Domestic Product (~GDP) 
t\GDP = GDP - GDP<1-1> • 
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Table 1 (contd.) 
(constant 1985 prices) 
(19) Investment in Manufacturing (IPMT) 
IPMT = IPML + IPMS 
(20) Total Private Investment (IPTP) 
IPTP = IPMT + IPNM 
(21) Nominal Domestic Credit to the Government (MSGC) 
MSGC = MSGCP • GDPDF 
(22) Change in Military Expenditures (WJLX) 
~MILX = MILX - MIL"<•-i> 
(23) Private Capital Stock (PK) 
PK= IPTP + IPTP(t-1) + IPTP(t-2) 
(24) Government Capital Stock (GK) 
GK= INFR + INFR(t-1) + INFR(t-2) 
EXOGENOUS VARIABLES 
(25) Employment (EMP) 
(26) Import Unit Price Index (UVZ) 
407 
Notes: Estimates are for the period 1974-1991. Two stage least squares estimations. See Sorites Group 
( 1993) for a description of the computational method used. r'(adj): adjusted coefficient of determination; 
F: F statistic; DW: Durbin-Watson Statistic, Durbin's H: Durbin's H statistic; (t-1): variable lagged one 
year; (t-2): variable lagged two years. •:significant at the 10% level;••: significant at the 5% level;•••: 
significant at the I% level. Equation estimates over different time periods implied that the estimated 
coefficients were stable. 
• Potential output grows fairly rapidly, averaging 7.4% over the 1992-96 
period and 7.6% in the interval 1996-2000. 
• It is likely that this pattern of growth could not be sustainable. As noted 
earlier, for a sustainable growth path, the government will most likely be 
forced to constrain its deficits in the range of 5% of GDP. In this simulation 
the fiscal deficits grow more rapidly than GDP, increasing their share to 6.9% 
by the end of the century (up from 5.1 in 1992). 
•Expanding deficits and the associated external borrowing requirement 
result in double digit inflation, accelerating from around 13% per annum in 
the 1992-96 period to slightly more than 20% for 1996-2000. 
• Given the government's current debt situation, rates of growth in public 
foreign borrowing of more than 10% in the 1992-2000 (accelerating to more 
than 16.3% for 1996-2000) are most likely unattainable. 
• Another problem with this particular growth path is that it implies a 
fairly sharp fall in Gross National Savings (from 14.1 % of GDP in 1992 to 
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Table 2 
Macroeconomic Simulation I: Endogenous Base Forecast, 1992-2000 
(billions of 1985 rupees) 
Year GDP Defense Expenditures Non-Defense 
Expenditures 
Value %Growth Value %Growth %GDP Value %Growth %GDP 
1992 730.1 7.6 53.5 9.0 7.3 114.9 6.4 15.7 
1994 835.2 7.0 63.8 9.2 7.6 138.7 9.9 16.6 
1996 972.0 7.9 71.1 5.6 7.3 168.6 10.3 17.3 
1998 1127.9 7.7 80.7 6.5 7.2 204.0 10.0 18.I 
2000 1306.4 7.6 90.7 6.0 6.9 245.6 9.7 18.8 
92/96 7.4 7.4 10.I 
96/2000 7.7 6.3 9.9 
90/2000 7.6 7.2 9.2 
Year GDP Deflator Gross National Savings Fiscal Deficits 
Value %Growth Value %Growth %GDP Value %Growth %GDP 
1992 170.9 11.2 102.8 7.5 14.1 37.0 13.7 5.1 
1994 215.8 12.4 125.6 10.5 15.0 46.1 11.6 5.5 
1996 278.9 13.7 136.1 4.1 14.0 55.9 10.1 5.8 
1998 386.2 14.9 148.5 4.5 13.2 72.5 13.9 6.4 
2000 585.0 26.0 163.9 5.1 12.5 90.1 11.5 6.9 
92/96- 13.0 7.3 10.9 
96,2000 20.3 4.8 12.7 
92/2000 15.6 6.3 11.8 
Year Foreign Borrowing Govt. Expenditures Govt. Revenues 
Value %Growth Value %Growth %GDP Value %Growth %GDP 
1992 13.5 3.5 168.4 7.2 23.1 131.4 6.6 18.0 
1994 12.4 -4.2 202.5 9.7 24.2 156.5 9.1 18.7 
1996 18.2 21.2 239.7 8.8 24.7 183.8 8.4 18.9 
1998 25.2 17.7 284.7 9.0 25.2 212.2 7.4 18.8 
2000 33.3 15.0 336.3 8.7 25.7 246.2 7.7 18.8 
92/96 7.8 8.8 
96,2000 16.3 7.6 
92/2000 10.2 7.6 
Notes: Simulation based on Equations in Table 1. Growth rates are the annual average rates over each 
interval, i.e., for 1992 the growth rate is from 1990 to 1992; for 1994 it 1992-1994. 
Assumvtions: Employment grows at 3.0% per annum; Import price index increases at 5% per annum. 
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Table 3 
Investment Simulation I: Endogenous Base Forecast, 1992-2000 
(billions of 1985 rupees) 
Private Capital Stock Private Investment Public Infrastructure 
Value %Growth Value %Growth %GDP Value %Growth %GDP 
1992 178.8 3.4 62.6 5.7 8.6 24.8 8.2 3.4 
1994 207.6 7.8 75.5 9.8 9.0 29.0 8.1 3.5 
1996 246.7 9.0 89.9 9.1 9.2 34.1 8.4 3.5 
1998 292.2 8.8 105.9 8.5 9.4 40.0 8.3 3.5 
2000 345.9 8.8 125.5 8.9 9.6 46.9 8.3 3.6 
92/96 8.4 9.5 8.3 
96/2000 8.8 8.7 8.3 
90/2000 7.5 8.4 8.3 
Year Public Capital Private Investment Private Investment 
Stock Manuf. Non-Manuf. 
Value %Growth Value %Growth %GDP Value %Growth %GDP 
1992 68.7 3.0 26.4 10.3 3.4 36.2 5.5 5.0 
1994 79.8 7.8 33.9 13.3 4.1 41.6 7.2 5.0 
1996 94.6 8.9 42.2. 11.6 4.3 47.8 7.2 4.9 
1998 110.9 8.3 51.6 10.6 4.6 54.2 6.5 4.8 
2000 129.2 7.9 63.2 10.7 4.8 62.3 7.2 4.8 
92/96 8.3 12.4 7.2 
96/2000 8.1 10.6 6.8 
92/2000 7.2 11.3 6.7 
Year Private Capital Manuf. Pl Large Scale Manuf. Pl Small-Scale Manuf. 
Value %Growth Value %Growth %Pl Value %Growth %PI 
1992 71.9 6.1 23.1 10.3 36.9 3.3 10.6 5.3 
1994 90.7 12.3 30.1 14.2 39.8 3.9 8.7 5.1 
1996 113.4 11.8 37.6 11.8 41.8 4.6 8.6 5.1 
1998 138.1 10.3 46.1 10.7 43.6 5.5 9.3 5.2 
2000 167.2 10.1 56.6 10.8 45.1 6.6 9.5 5.3 
92/96 12.1 13.0 8.7 
96/2000 10.2 19.8 9.4 
92/2000 10.1 11.5 9.3 
Notes: Simulation based on Equations in Table I. Growth rates are the annual average rates over each interval, 
i.e., for 1992 the growth rate is from 1990 to 1992; for 1994 ii 1992-1994. 
Assumptions: Employment grows at 3.0% per annum; Import price index increases at 5% per annum. 
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12.5% in 2000. As noted earlier, the country will need to increase its savings 
efforts to avoid many of the problems associated with its growing debt 
burden. 
• Private investment in manufacturing expands quite rapidly under this 
scenario, averaging more than 10% per annum. The rate for large scale units 
is even higher at 11.5%. 
This scenario illustrates the main problem facing the Pakistani 
government: unless the public sector is able to reduce its deficit, high rates 
of sustained growth will not be possible. Public expenditure and/or revenue 
responses will have to be modified from past patterns if the economy hopes 
to experience an acceptable rate of growth during the 1990s. The real 
question is how to alter the public sector's fiscal accounts with minimum 
disruption to the private sector. 
6. Optimal Control Simulations 
In order to examine a spectrum of fiscal alternatives open to the 
government, a series of optimal control simulations was performed. These 
simulations were based on: 
• a set of behavioral equations (Table 1) that represents a system that is 
to be controlled 
• a set of constraints on the policy variables of the system -government 
expenditures, the fiscal deficit, foreign borrowing, gross national savings, 
inflation. 
• a set of boundary conditions on the variables -employment and the 
import price index, and 
• a performance index which is to be maximized. In this case the 
objective was to maximize the terminal private capital stock. 
The essential idea of optimal control is to derive the optimal policy to 
overcome specified constraints (i.e. government expenditure level, the fiscal 
deficit, and foreign borrowing) in order to steer the economy to a specified 
set of targets, i.e. the maximum stock of private capital in the terminal year, 
2000. In the simulations that follow, constraints are placed on government 
expenditures (changing them from e0ndogenous variables in Table 1 to 
exogenous policy variables) one at a time until a final set of performance 
targets is met. In their order of introduction, the constraints include: 
• public foreign borrowing limited to a range of greater than zero but 
less than 5% increase over the 1992-2000 period. This figure corresponds to 
the average over the 1980-90 period of 5.3%, but considerably below the 
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28.5% for 1986-90. 
• infrastructure constrained in the range greater than zero, but equal or 
less than 10% per annum average growth rate. Infrastructure had expanded 
at an average annual rate of 7.1 % over the 1980s, but had decelerated to 
4.3% over the 1986-90 period. If beneficial to the economy, the model 
constraint lets infrastructure expand at rates somewhat over its historical 
growth path. 
• non-defense expenditures were confined to an expansion of greater or 
equal to 2.0% and less than or equal to 7%. The upper constraint is 
somewhat below the 10.1 % average of the 1980s. Clearly, many of the 
country's current fiscal problems stem from the fact that non-defense 
expenditures grew at rates considerably above that of government revenues 
(7.7%) during the 1980s. 
It should be noted that the foreign borrowing was constrained in all of the 
simulations, whereas infrastructure and non-defense expenditures were 
introduced in subsequent scenarios. 
The side conditions (outcome constraints) that ultimately had to be met were 
• fiscal deficits constrained to less than 5% of GDP 
• inflation: less than 5% average rate 
• gross national savings greater than 14.0% of GDP (1990 value) 
Two conditions deemed desirable, but not formally introduced as policy 
objectives were that: 
• By the year 2000, defense expenditures should fall below 6% (they 
averaged slightly more than 7% during the 1980s, which is high by 
international standards). 
• Given the government's goal of privatization, there should be a 
contraction of the share of GDP accounted for by government expenditures. 
The government sector expanded from around 17% of GDP in 1980 to more 
than 23% in 1990. Lowering this share to around 18-19% of GDP would be 
consistent with the government's liberalization policies. 
Given these two sets of constraints, the model optimized the terminal 
stock of private capital. That is, after government expenditures were 
controlled to meet deficit, borrowing, inflation and savings conditions, how 
rapidly would the private sector be able to accumulate capital? As a basis 
of comparison, several alternative goals were specified: (a) the public stock 
of capital and (b) GDP as the variables to be maximized. Here interest was 
in determining whether expanding private investment came into conflict with 
the country's other major policy objectives. 
412 Robert E. LOONEY 
Finally, as a basis of examining the role of defense expenditures in 
affecting private investment (directly through Eqs. 14 and 15 of Table 1 and 
indirectly through the fiscal deficit equation}, several alternative strategies 
were examined: 
• High defense budgetary strategy, where defense expenditures were 
constrained to a range of greater or equal to 5% and less than or equal to 
7% average over the 1992-2000 period. 
•Moderate defense budgetary strategy, where defense expenditures were 
constrained to a range of greater or equal to 3% and less than or equal to 
5% average over the 1992-2000 period. 
• Low defense budgetary strategy, where defense expenditures were 
constrained to a range of greater or equal to 1 % and less than or equal to 
3% average over the 1992-2000 period. 
In all, 21 simulations were performed under alternative budgetary 
assumptions.5 Several general patterns can be easily identified: First, the 
outcomes obtained by simply adopting the three defense budgetary strategies 
(without constraining other government expenditures) in an environment of 
constrained foreign borrowing: 
•The low defense budgetary strategy (constraining budgetary allocations 
increases to a range of 1-3% average rate of increase) does not solve the 
country's fiscal deficit problems. In fact, deficits increase as a share of GDP 
to 6.1 (down from 7.1% in 1998) % by the year 2000. 
• In large part this growth path stems from the fact that non-defense 
expenditures increase at rates greater than real GDP. In turn the revenue base 
expands slowly (4.7% average over the 1990-2000 period) compared with 
overall public expenditures (5.6). Private investment in manufacturing would 
gradually decline, reaching an average growth rate of 9.6 over the 1996-2000 
period. Investment in small scale manufacturing would be less affected. 
• As a result of the growirig deficit, the country's saving rate and rate of 
inflation assume values outside the acceptable range of policy outcomes. 
• Although defense expenditures decline to 4.4% of GDP by the year 
2000, total government expenditures increase to almost 23% of GDP (up 
from 21.8% in 1992). 
• Expanding defense expenditures into the moderate (3-5% growth} and 
high (5-7%) would result in an acceleration in both GDP and private 
investment in manufacturing. Specifically, the average growth in GDP over 
5 The detailed tables containing these results are available from the author upon request. 
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the 1990-2000 period would increase from 5.8% in the low defense strategy 
to 6.1 % in the moderate and 6.4% in the high defense strategy. The 
corresponding figures for private investment are more dramatic (5.7%, 7.0% 
and 8.2%). 
• The relatively dramatic increase in private investment is due to the fact 
that expanded defense expenditures do not have a major impact of the fiscal 
deficit in this environment. For the low defense scenario, the deficit expands 
at an average rate of 8.9% per annum over the 1990-2000 period. This 
increases to only 9.1% with the moderate scenario and up to 9.5% with the 
high defense budgetary strategy. The corresponding crowding-out of private 
investment is less that the direct stimulus provided by the allocations to 
defense. 
• In sum, however, all three defense scenarios violate the inflation, 
savings and deficit constraints. For this reason, the government would have 
to resort to increased austerity in other sections of the budget (assuming the 
historical pattern of revenues). 
• In the next series of forecasts, the annual growth rate of infrastructure 
investment was constrained in the range of 0-10%, while the fiscal deficit 
was set at a minimum of 34.3 billion (1985) rupees (the actual deficit in 
1991) and a maximum of 200 billion rupees. The most interesting features of 
this environment are that: 
• Because of potential crowding-out of private investment, optimization 
of the terminal stock of private capital entails holding the fiscal deficit to its 
minimum figure (34.3 billion rupees). Of significance is the fact that does not 
change over the three budgetary scenarios. 
• Compared to GDP growth rates of 5.8%, 6.1 %, and 6.4% in the 
unconstrained infrastructure scenarios, the corresponding rates are 6.3%, 6.8% 
and 6.9% with the 0-10% limits placed on the growth in infrastructure 
investment. The corresponding figures for the growth of private investment 
in manufacturing are 8.4%, 9.5% and 10.7% p.a. (compared with 5.7%, 7.0% 
and 8.2% p.a. in the first set of simulations). 
• While the rate of inflation is still outside the tolerable range of 5%, the 
fiscal deficits of all three scenarios decline to sustainable shares of GDP. 
Savings performance also improves with 'this aggregate increasing to 16.6% 
of GDP in the low defense budgetary strategy to 17.3% in the moderate 
defense scenario and 18.2% in the high defense budget. 
• To determine if inflation could be reduced without seriously 
compromising private investment, the next set of simulations examined the 
scope for policies with this aim in mind. Again assuming that public revenues 
.,, . 
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will follow their historical patterns, reducing the fiscal deficit through 
expenditure austerity is the most logical option. Politically, deficit reduction 
at a rate of more than 5% per annum is not feasible. Hence the lower bound 
on the deficit was set at a maximum decline of 5% per annum average over 
the 1992-2000 period. 
• The most significant finding of this set of simulations is that in order 
to maximize the stock of private capital, the model selects the lowest deficit 
allowable. That is in all three defense strategies, the deficit is reduced at 5% 
per annum throughout the 1990s. As a result, the deficits for each simulation 
fall well below the 5% minimum reduction target. 
• With controlled deficit reduction the potential supply of GDP increases 
at rates of 6.6%, 6.8% and 7.1 %, respectively under the low, medium and 
high defense budgetary strategies. The corresponding figures without deficit 
reduction were 6.3%, 6.8% and 6.9%. 
• For private investment in manufacturing, the corresponding figures were 
9.1%, 10.2% and 11.0% (compared with 8.4%, 9.5% and 10.7% without 
deficit reduction). 
• With deficit reduction inflation falls within the acceptable policy target 
range of 4.3% (average rate for 1990-2000) for the low defense strategy, but 
increases to 5.2% for the medium and high defense strategies. It should be 
noted, however, that in the 1996-2000 period, inflation is reduced to an 
average of 1. 7% per annum with the moderate budgetary and 1.3% for the 
high defense strategy. 
Summing up, controlling defense expenditures at rates of increase 
averaging 7% or less together with a limitation on infrastructure investment 
of 10% would be all that was necessary for GDP to grow at rates more than 
6.5% and private investment at rates more than 8.4%. This result occurs 
despite the fact that a fairly strong constraint was placed on the public 
sector's foreign borrowing. 
In the simulations summarized above, non-defense expenditures were 
endogenous (determined by Eq. 5 of Table 1). Changing this variable to a 
policy instrument (constrained in an annual average range of between 2% and 
10% per annum) resulted in several !11arginal changes from the previous set 
of findings: 
• As in the previous set of simulations, maximizing the terminal stock of 
private capital, implies a minimization (within the rages specified) of the 
fiscal deficit -this pattern applied to each of the three defense budgetary 
strategies. 
• The country's saving performance improves under each budgetary 
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strategy with savings reaching 18.1 %, 18.9% and 19.6% of GDP in the year 
2000 under the low, medium and high defense strategies. The corresponding 
rates before imposing the constraint on non- defense expenditures were: 
18.4%, 19.2% and 14.4%. 
• In this scenario, inflation averages 4.3%, 5.1 % and 6.3% over the 
1900-2000 period under the low, medium and high defense strategies. For 
the high defense case, this is a deterioration from the 5.2% rate obtained prior 
to converting non-defense expenditures into a policy variable. Again it 
should be noted that under all of these scenarios inflation decelerated well 
below 5% in the 1996-2000 period. 
•The rates of GDP growth (1990-2000) are 5.1%, 7.0% and 7.1% for 
the low, moderate and high defense budgetary strategies, respectively. The 
corresponding rates without the non-defense expenditure constraint were 
6.6%, 6.8% and 7.1%. This finding suggests that at low rates of growth in 
defense expenditures defense expenditures aggregate demand becomes a 
problem great enough to offset the depressing effects of increased federal 
deficits. As we move into higher rates of defense expenditures, this demand 
effect becomes less important and the deficit takes on a larger importance in 
affecting the macro-economy. In this environment, constraining non-defense 
expenditures accelerates the growth of GDP. 
• The corresponding rates of growth in private investment in 
manufacturing were 9.1%, 10.1% and 10.7% for the low, medium and high 
defense budgetary strategies. These rates compare to the 9 .1 %, 10.2% and 
11.0% rates experienced before non-defense expenditures became a policy 
variable. 
• By the year 2000 the share of defense expenditures falls to 4.1 %, 4. 7% 
and 5.9% in the low, medium, and high budgetary scenarios. Again this is 
down from the plus 7% rates experienced in the 1980s. Also, by the year 
2000 the share of government expenditures in GDP declined to 18.6%, 19.5% 
and 19.7%. These figures are down from the 23% plus rates in the late 
1980s. 
In short, some marginal improvements can be made in GDP growth and 
private investment in manufacturing through placing some loose constraints 
on non-defense expenditures. Longer mn gains in the form of higher savings 
rates would be the main advantage of this particular strategy. The fact 
remains that several fiscal options capable of reviving growth and private 
sector capital formation are available to the authorities. Given their 
parameters, these policy packages are not of the question politically. Austerity 
and macroeconomic balance does not have to be at the expense of growth 
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and real capital formation. In short, a moderate budgetary strategy program 
along the line outlined above (Tables 4 and 5) should enable the country to 
meet its main policy objectives without resorting to severe austerity or 
abandoning its economic liberalization/privatization programs. 
As an alternative, the government might consider a shock therapy type 
program with an immediate drop in the deficit. Using the same assumptions 
for expenditures as in the moderate budgetary strategy with controlled (5%) 
deficit reduction, this simulation constrains the deficit at 25 billion (1985) 
rupees throughout the period up to 2000. The results (Tables 6 and 7) differ 
from the controlled deficit reduction case in several regards: 
•While the average rate of increase in GDP (1990-2000)is the same in 
both scenarios, inflation is somewhat lower in the shock therapy case ( 4.4% 
down from 5.1%). 
• Total private investment is the same in both scenarios (8.5% ). In the 
shock therapy case however, private investment in large-scale manufacturing 
grows at a higher rate (10. 7%) than in the controlled deficit case (9. 7% ). 
Similar simulations were undertaken with the terminal stock of GDP as 
the objective function. As might be expected, the moderate budgetary strategy 
results in a higher rate of growth in GDP (8.0% average for the period 1990-
2000 versus 7.0% for the terminal stock of private capital). Also the rate of 
private investment in manufacturing (10.1 % is marginally lower than that 
obtained by optimizing the terminal capital stock (10.4% ). Other differences 
include: 
• the saving rate would be higher maximizing the terminal stock of 
private capital (18.4% in the year 2000 versus 16.5% ). 
• inflation would be marginally lower maximizing GDP (3.7% versus 
4.2%). 
• the share of government expenditures in GDP is somewhat lower in the 
GDP simulation (17.1% for 2000 versus 18.4%). 
In short, the results of the maximization of the terminal productive 
capacity of the economy (GDP) produced results closely approximating those 
obtained from optimizing the terminal stock of private capital. Choosing one 
objective as superior to the other would be largely a matter on how one 
• 
valued savings, inflation and the share of government expenditures in GDP. 
For all practical purposes, however, both objectives would yield the same 
growth in private investment. Of the scenarios considered here, those using 
shock therapy could be considered the optimal for policy purposes. If the 
shock therapy approach is deemed politically risky, the moderate budgetary 
strategy of controlled deficit reduction would also yield acceptable results. 
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Table 4 
Macroeconomic Simulation II: Optimization of the Terminal Stock of 
Private Capital: Moderate Defense Budgetary Strategy, With Loosely 
Constrained Infrastructure Investment/Non Defense Expenditures, and the 
Option of Controlled Deficit Reduction 
(billions of 1985 rupees) 
Year GDP Defense Expenditures Non-Defense 
Expenditures 
Value Growth Value Growth %GDP Value Growth %GDP 
1992 735.0 7.9 46.9 2.1 6.4 111.6 5.0 15.2 
1994 833.3 6.5 51.9 5.2 6.2 121.3 4.3 14.6 
1996 940.0 6.2 57.1 4.9 6.1 134.4 5.3 14.3 
1998 1073.4 6.9 62.9 5.0 5.9 148.7 5.2 13.9 
2000 1235.9 7.3 58.5 -3.6 4.7 182.3 10.7 14.8 
92/96 6.3 5.0 
96/2000 7.1 0.6 
92/2000 7.0 2.7 
Year GDP Deflator Gross National Savings Fiscal Deficits 
Value Growth Value Growth %GDP Value Growth %GDP 
1992 170.9 11.8 113.1 . 12.8 15.4 27.0 -2.8 3.7 
1994 191.2 5.8 131.6 7.9 15.8 29.4 4.3 3.5 
1996 211.3 5.1 161.9 10.9 17.2 26.5 -5.1 2.8 
1998 223.1 2.8 195.0 9.7 17.2 24.1 -4.6 2.2 
2000 224.3 0.3 233.1 9.3 18.9 22.9 -2.5 1.9 
92/96 5.4 9.4 -0.5 
96/2000 1.5 9.5 -3.6 
92/2000 5.1 10.1 -2.2 
Year Foreign Borrowing Govt. Expenditures Govt. Revenues 
Value Growth Value Growth %GDP Value Growth %GDP 
1992 13.8 4.7 158.5 4.2 21.5 131.4 5.6 17.9 
1994 15.2 4.9 173.1 4.5 20.8 143.7 4.6 17.2 
1996 16.7 4.8 191.5 5.2 20.4 165.0 7.2 17.6 
1998 18.4 5.0 211.6 5.1 19.7 187.5 6.6 17.5 
2000 17.1 -3.6 240.8 6.7 19.5 217.9 7.8 17.6 
92/96 4.9 4.S 5.9 
96/2000 0.6 5.9 7.2 
92/2000 3.1 5.1 6.3 
Assumptions: Employment grows at 3.0% per annum; Import price index increases at 5% per annum; Defense 
expenditures are constrained in a range of 3-5% increase per annum; the growth in foreign borrowing is 
constrained in the range of 0-5% increase per annum; infrastructure is constrained to grow in the range of 0-10% 
per annum, with non-defense expenditures in the range of 2-7%, and the fiscal deficit allowed to decrease at 
a maximum of 5% per annum. 
. . 
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Table 5 
Investment Simulation II: Optimization of the Terminal Stock of Private 
Capital: Moderate Defense Budgetary Strategy, With Loosely Constrained 
Infrastructure Investment/Non Defense Expenditures, and the Option of 
Controlled Deficit Reduction 
(billions of 1985 rupees) 
Private Capital Stock Private Investment Public Infrastructure 
Value Growth Value Growth %GDP Value Growth %GDP 
1992 182.2 4.4 66.l 8.6 9.0 24.0 6.4 3.3 
1994 212.0 7.9 75.7 7.0 9.1 26.5 5.1 3.2 
1996 245.9 7.7 89.0 8.4 9.5 29.2 5.0 3.1 
1998 290.4 8.7 104.8 8.5 9.8 32.0 4.7 3.0 
2000 347.8 9.4 126.6 9.9 10.2 35.5 5.3 2.9 
92/96 7.8 7.7 5.0 
96/2000 9.1 9.2 5.0 
92/2000 7.6 8.5 5.3 
Year Public Capital Stock Private Investment Manuf. Private Invest.Non-Manuf. 
Value Growth Value Growth %GDP Value Growth %GDP 
1992 67.9 2.4 26.7 10.9 3.6 39.4 10.8 5.4 
1994 75.7 5.6 32.4 10.2 3.9 43.3 4.8 5.2 
1996 83.0 4.7 39.7 10.7 4.0 49.3 6.7 5.2 
1998 91.9 5.2 48.6 10.6 4.5 56.3 6.9 5.2 
2000 101.3 5.0 57.2 8.5 4.6 69.3 10.9 5.6 
92/96 5.1 10.4 5.8 
96/2000 5.1 9.6 8.9 
92/2000 4.6 10.2 8.0 
Year Private Capital Manuf. Pl Large Scale Manuf. PI Small-Scale Manuf. 
Value Growth Value Growth %Pl Value Growth %PI 
1992 72.1 6.2 23.4 11.0 35.4 3.3 10.6 5.0 
1994 88.3 10.7 28.7 10.7 37.9 3.7 5.9 4.9 
1996 108.0 10.6 35.5 11.2 40.0 4.2 6.5 4.7 
1998 132.2 10.6 43.7 10.9 41.7 4.8 6.9 4.6 
2000 159.4 9.8 51.5 8.6 40.7 5.8 9.9 4.5 
92/96 10.6 t.1.0 6.2 
96/2000 10.2 9.7 8.4 
92/2000 9.6 9.7 7.9 
Assumptions: Employment grows at 3.0% per annum; Import price index increases at 5% per annum; defense 
expenditures are constrained in a range of 3-5% increase per annum; the growth in foreign borrowing is 
constrained in the range of 0-5% increase per annum; infrastructure is constrained to grow in the range of 0-10% 
per annum, with non-defense expenditures in the range of 2-7%, and the fiscal deficit allowed to decrease at 
a maximum of 5% per annum. 
METU STUDIES IN DEVELOPMENT 419 
Table 6 
Macroeconomic Simulation III: Optimization of the Terminal Stock of 
Private Capital: Moderate Defense Budgetary Strategy, With Loosely 
Constrained Infrastructure Investment/Non Defense Expenditures, With 
Shock Therapy Deficit Reduction, 1992-2000 
(billions of 1985 rupees) 
Year GDP Defense Expenditures Non-Defense Expenditures 
Value %Growth Value %Growth %GDP Value %Growth %GDP 
1992 735.2 7.2 47.0 2.2 6.4 109.5 3.9 14.9 
1994 836.7 6.7 51.9 5.1 6.2 117.8 3.7 14.1 
1996 948.5 6.5 57.2 5.0 6.0 134.2 6.7 14.1 
1998 1082.9 6.9 61.7 3.9 5.7 152.8 6.7 14.1 
2000 1238.1 6.9 59.5 -1.8 4.8 178.1 8.0 14.4 
92/96 6.6 5.0 5.2 
96/2000 6.9 1.0 7.3 
92/2000 7.0 2.8 5.9 
Year GDP Deflator Gross National Savings Fiscal Deficits 
Value %Growth Value %Growth %GDP Value %Growth %GDP 
1992 170.9 11.8 115.2 13.8 15.7 25.0 -6.5 3.4 
1994 190.0 5.4 140.4 10.4 16.8 25.0 0.0 3.0 
1996 197.4 1.9 166.7 9.0 17.6 25.0 0.0 2.6 
1998 203.3 1.5 195.2 8.2 18.0 25.7 1.4 2.4 
2000 205.3 0.5 227.7 8.0 18.4 25.0 -1.4 2.0 
92/96 3.7 9.7 0.0 
96/2000 1.0 8.1 0.0 
92/2000 4.2 9.9 -1.3 
Year Foreign Borrowing Govt. Expenditures Govt. Revenues 
Value %Growth Value %Growth %GDP Value %Growth %GDP 
1992 13.8 4.7 156.4 3.5 21.3 131.4 5.6 17.9 
1994 15.2 4.9 169.7 4.2 20.3 144.7 4.9 17.3 
1996 16.7 4.8 191.4 6.2 20.2 166.4 7.2 17.5 
1998 18.4 5.0 214.5 5.9 19.8 188.8 6.5 17.4 
2000 17.1 -3.6 237.6 5.2 19.2 212.6 6.1 17.2 
92/96 4.9 ~.2 6.1 
96/2000 0.6 5.6 6.3 
92/2000 3.1 5.0 6.1 
Assumptions: Employment grows at 3.0% per annum; Import price index increases at 5% per annum; defense 
expenditures are constrained in a range of 3-5% increase per annum; the growth in foreign borrowing is 
constrained in the range of 0-5% increase per annum; infrastructure is constrained to grow in the range of 0-10% 
per annum, with non-defense expenditures in the range of 2-7%, and the fiscal deficit allowed to decrease at 
a maximum of 5% per annum. 
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Table 7 
Investment Simulation III: Optimization of the Terminal Stock of Private 
Capital: Moderate Defense Budgetary Strategy, With Loosely Constrained 
Infrastructure Investment/Non Defense Expenditures, and With Shock 
Therapy Deficit Reduction 
(billions of 1985 rupees) 
Private Capital Stock Private Investment Public Infrastructure 
Value %Growth Value %Growth %GDP Value %Growth %GDP 
1992 182.3 4.4 66.2 8.7 9.0 24.0 6.4 3.3 
1994 213.6 8.2 76.8 7.7 9.2 26.5 5.1 3.2 
1996 250.3 8.3 90.7 8.7 9.6 29.2 5.0 3.1 
1998 295.0 8.6 106.8 8.5 9.9 32.2 5.0 3.0 
2000 348.9 8.8 126.2 8.7 10.2 35.5 5.0 2.9 
92/96 8.3 8.2 5.0 
96/2000 8.7 8.6 5.0 
92/2000 7.6 8.5 5.3 
Year Public Capital Private Investment Private Investment 
Stock Manuf. Non-Manuf. 
Value %Growth Value %Growth %GDP Value %Growth %GDP 
1992 67.9 2.4 26.7 10.9 3.6 39.4 10.8 4.7 
1994 75.7 5.6 32.9 11.0 3.9 43.9 5.6 5.2 
1996 83.0 4.7 40.8 11.4 4.3 50.0 6.7 5.3 
1998 91.9 5.2 49.6 10.3 4.6 57.2 7.0 5.3 
2000 101.3 5.0 58.2 8.3 4.7 68.1 9.1 5.5 
92/96 1 5.1 11.2 6.1 
96/2000 5.1 9.3 8.0 
92/2000 4.6 10.4 7.8 
Year Private Capital Manuf. Pl Large Scale Manuf. Pl Small-Scale Manuf. 
Value %Growth Value %Growth %GDP Value %Growth %GDP 
1992 72.2 6.3 23.5 11.2 35.5 3.3 10.6 4.9 
1994 89.1 11.1 29.3 11.7 38.1 3.7 5.9 4.8 
1996 110.5 11.4 36.6 11.8 40.3 4.2 6.5 4.7 
1998 135.4 10.7 44.7 10.5 41.8 4.9 8.0 4.6 
2000 161.9 9.3 52.4 8.3 41.5 5.8 8.8 4.6 
92/96 11.2 lt.7 6.2 
96/2000 10.0 9.4 8.4 
92/2000 9.7 10.7 7.9 
Assumptions: Employment grows al 3.0% per annum; Import price index increases at 5% per annum; defense 
expenditures are constrained in a range of 3-5% increase per annum; the growth in foreign borrowing is 
constrained in the range of 0-5% increase per annum; infrastructure is constrained to grow in the range of 0-10% 
per annum, with non-defense expenditures in the range of 2-7%, and the fiscal deficit allowed to decrease at 
a maximum of 5% per annum. 
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7. Conclusions 
Using an earlier version (Looney, 1992) of the macroeconomic model 
developed above it was found that increased government investment tended 
to crowd out private investment in manufacturing. Historically, and with no 
other adjustments in government fiscal policy, it was found that over the 
1974-91 period a modest increase in government investment (2.5%) crowded 
out enough private investment to reduce GDP in 1991 by slightly over 13%. 
It was also found that the government could counter this contraction in 
private investment and GDP by increasing its borrowing in external capital 
markets. However, external borrowing proved to be a very costly solution. 
For example, beginning in the mid-1980s a 2.5% increase in government 
investment would have to be matched by an increase in public foreign 
borrowing of more than 10%, simply to preserve levels of investment and 
GDP that would have occurred in the absence of increased government 
investment. Given the country's deficient infrastructure the future looked 
bleak indeed. 
However, using an optimal control analysis and expanding the policy 
options available to the government, it appears that with proper economic 
management the country can return to a high growth path while avoiding 
many of the imbalances that have characterized the country"s recent economic 
performance. 
The simulations summarized above suggest that a critical element of any 
future policy package must place a high priority on deficit reduction. This 
strategy would entail either an immediate sharp reduction in the deficit or a 
decline in the deficit by 5% per annum up to the year .:woo. This strategy 
would provide a good chance of maintaining fairly high rates of growth 
throughout the 1990s. 
For example, in an environment of controlled deficit reduction. limiting 
the expansion of defense expenditures to rates of increase averaging 7rr l)r 
less, together with a limitation on the growth of infrastructure investment of 
10% p.a. would enable the economy to expand at rates of more than b.5c,c 
per annum and private investment at rates more than 8A''c. These rates of 
growth could occur in environment• of relatively constrained foreign 
borrowing, i.e., rates of borrowing averaging kss than sec- throughlHlt the rest 
of the 1990s. 
The rate of growth of private investmt·nt in manufal·turing umkr thl'Sl" 
assumptions is likely to he below the rates ohtained in the [ lJl\Os. Hl)WC\'t'r, 
with limitations on non-defense expenditun .. ·s. rates of gwwth in the 10';;. 
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range are not out of the question. In addition, a program should enable the 
government to meet all of the country's main economic objectives -an 
inflation rate less than 5%, increased savings rate (from around 15% of GDP 
in the early 1990s up to nearly 19% by the end of the century), and a 
declining share of GDP accounted for by government expenditures. In 
essence, this program would create a macroeconomic environment conducive 
to obtaining the greatest benefits from the current privatization program. 
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Oz et 
Pakistan'da ozel yatmmlarm makroekonomik k1s1tlan 
Bu yazmm amac1, Pakistan'da maliye politikalanmn ozel kesim yatmm egilimlerini 
ve <;<>k onemli oldugu herkes~ kabul edilen imalat sanayiindeki ozel yatmm kararlanm 
nastl etkiledigini ar3§t1rmakt1r. Alternatif maliye politikas1 paketlerinin etkilerini incelemek 
uzere geli§tirilen bir optimal kontrol analizi yard1m1yla basiretli bir ekonomik yonetimin 
Pakistan ekonomisini son y11larda stk s1k ka~1la§ttg1 dengesizliklerden koruyabilecegi ve 
ekonomiyi daha h1zh bir buyume l;izgisine oturtabilecegi gosterilmi§tir. Analiz, gelecekteki 
herhangi bir politika paketinde yer almast gereken ve kilit onem ta§tyan ogenin kamu 
al;tklannm daralt1lmas1 oldugunu dti§tindurmektedir. 
